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Hypnosis research binds phenomenology and neuroscience. Here we show how recent
evidence probing the impact of hypnosis and suggestion can inform and advance a
neurophenomenological approach. In contrast to meditative practices that involve lengthy
and intensive training, hypnosis induces profound alterations in subjective experience
following just a few words of suggestion. Individuals highly responsive to hypnosis
can quickly and effortlessly manifest atypical conscious experiences as well as override
deeply entrenched processes. These capacities open new avenues for suspending
habitual modes of attention and achieving refined states of meta-awareness. Furthermore,
hypnosis research sheds light on the effects of suggestion, expectation, and interpersonal
factors beyond the narrow context of hypnotic procedures. Such knowledge may help
to further foster phenomenological interviewing methods, improve experiential reports,
and elucidate the mechanisms of contemplative practices. Incorporating hypnosis and
suggestion into the broader landscape of neurophenomenology, therefore, would likely
help bridge subjective experience and third-person approaches to the mind.
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INTRODUCTION
Hypnosis and other forms of suggestion hold great promise for
advancing the synthesis of phenomenology and cognitive neuro-
science. While scientists have access to a plethora of advanced
methods for imaging and modeling the brain, first-person
procedures for investigating subjective experience lag behind.
Anticipating this methodological crisis, in the 1990s Francisco
Varela proposed “a quest to marry modern cognitive science
and a disciplined approach to human experience” (Varela, 1996).
He coined this approach “neurophenomenology”: a mission to
establish a method within the cognitive sciences for studying
first-person experience alongside third-person accounts of cog-
nition. Neurophenomenology involves a threefold experimental
challenge: (1) helping participants generate and sustain specific
experiential states, (2) fostering meta-awareness of these states,
and (3) collecting accurate first-person descriptions of those
states (Lutz and Thompson, 2003). From there, researchers can
analyze such qualitative data alongside behavioral and neurobio-
logical data, eventually establishing “strong reciprocal constraints
between phenomenological accounts of experience and cognitive-
scientific accounts of mental processes” (Lutz and Thompson,
2003, p. 48). Here we propose that cognitive scientists can harness
hypnosis and related forms of suggestion to meet the challenges
of neurophenomenology. We outline recent advances in hypno-
sis research to illuminate how this powerful top-down instrument
provides a means of (1) generating specific and reliable alterations
in consciousness, (2) achieving first-person awareness of the liv-
ing stream of experience, and (3) elucidating phenomenological
interviewing methods to facilitate experiential reporting. Thus,
hypnosis offers a largely untapped resource for actualizing the
neurophenomenological project.
In recent years, cognitive scientists have increasingly turned to
contemplative practices to shed light on both ordinary and atypi-
cal cognition. We recently published a special issue synthesizing
empirical studies of hypnosis and meditation to present a fresh
integrative perspective on contemplative science (Lifshitz and
Raz, 2012). In addition to elucidating the empirical correlates
of conscious experience, such practices by their very nature call
researchers to address the qualitative lived experience of the
subject (Thompson, 2006). Some of the earliest proposals for
a neurophenomenological method drew heavily on meditative
techniques geared at refining attentional skills and improving
awareness of the ongoing contents of experience (Varela, 1996).
Yet, while altered states of consciousness and contemplative prac-
tices have long occupied a central place in neurophenomenology,
hypnosis per se has received relatively little attention as an
exemplar of this approach. A mounting body of scientific
evidence has demonstrated that hypnotic suggestions can pro-
duce remarkable alterations in subjective experience as well as
cognitive and brain function. While historically hypnosis was
associated with a special state of consciousness known as “trance,”
scientists today disagree concerning the cognitive, behavioral,
and neurobiological markers of an ostensible hypnotic state
(Oakley and Halligan, 2009, 2010). Regardless of lingering
spats concerning the importance of induction rituals and the
notion of an “altered state,” however, the collective data clearly
demonstrate that hypnotic suggestions can profoundly alter
perception, emotion, thought, and behavior, as well as associated
brain functions (Kihlstrom, 2008). Among responsive—i.e.,
highly suggestible—individuals, hypnosis provides a means of
rapidly and consistently generating a wide range of uncommon
subjective experiences. Hypnosis therefore stands as a promising
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vehicle for investigating otherwise elusive dimensions of
consciousness.
RELIABLY INDUCING SPECIFIC MIND STATES AND
EXPERIENCES
Hypnotic suggestions allow researchers to generate and study
atypical experiential states that would otherwise prove unstable,
rare, or short-lived. One fruitful approach employs hypnotic sug-
gestions to produce “virtual patients” with transient syndromes
nearly identical to genuine clinical psychopathologies in terms
of experiential substrates and in some cases also neurobiologi-
cal correlates (Oakley andHalligan, 2009; Woody and Szechtman,
2011). For example, one study used hypnotic suggestion to pro-
duce compelling experiences of mirrored-self misidentification—
a clinical condition wherein patients no longer recognize their
own reflection in a mirror. Following a suggestion that “the
person you see in the mirror will not be you, it will be a
stranger,” highly suggestible subjects failed to recognize their
own reflection and retained their delusional beliefs in the face
of verbal challenges (e.g., “How is it possible that the per-
son in the mirror looks just like you?”) as well as behavioral
demands (e.g., being asked to touch their nose while staring
in the mirror) (Barnier et al., 2008). We speculate that closer
phenomenological investigation of such hypnotically induced dis-
tortions of self-perception could reveal nuances concerning the
relation between embodied subjectivity and the self viewed as
external object (cf. Rochat and Zahavi, 2011). Beyond delusions
of mirrored-self recognition, cognitive scientists have employed
hypnotic suggestion to generate a wide range of virtual syn-
dromes including obsessive-compulsive disorder (Woody and
Szechtman, 2011), synesthesia (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009),
alien-hand syndrome (Blakemore et al., 2003), and visuospatial
neglect (Priftis et al., 2011). In addition to the obvious practi-
cal advantages of studying virtual rather than genuine clinical
patients, hypnotic analogs have the added benefit of allowing
researchers to generate subtle nuances in symptomology, as well
as design and implement novel delusions and psychopatholo-
gies that suit their specific research questions. More broadly,
this approach points to the great flexibility afforded by hypno-
sis to rapidly and consistently modulate deep-rooted structures
of experience.
Beyond inducing transient psychopathological symptoms,
hypnosis offers insight into spontaneous cognition and the resting
brain. Contemplative practices including hypnosis are emerging
as valuable tools for investigating the default-mode—a network
of brain regions that show increased activity at rest. Default-mode
network (DMN) activity correlates with a wide range of inter-
nally directed cognitive processes, including mind-wandering,
self-oriented thinking, moral reasoning, and episodic memory
(Buckner et al., 2008); yet, it is difficult to experimentally manip-
ulate the DMN alongside these processes because the defining
feature of the DMN is that it activates spontaneously, in the
absence of external task demands. Accordingly, in the past few
years, researchers have begun employing contemplative prac-
tices in concert with intrinsic connectivity imaging methods to
elucidate the psychological correlates of resting-state brain net-
works such as the DMN (e.g., McGeown et al., 2009; Brewer
et al., 2011; Pyka et al., 2011; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Pagnoni,
2012; Taylor et al., 2013) Following this approach, a recent study
reported that hypnotic induction increased subjective ratings of
attentional absorption and decreased ratings of mind-wandering.
Moreover, these changes were associated with decreased DMN
activity and increased activity in prefrontal attention networks
(Deeley et al., 2012). Another recent account leveraged a sim-
ilar neurophenomenological approach to show that subjective
ratings of hypnotic depth following an induction were associ-
ated with changes in global functional connectivity in the elec-
troencephalography signal. Furthermore, differences in subjective
experiential dimensions such as “imagery,” “everyday concerns,”
and “vestibular and other bodily experiences” were associated
with distinct patterns of connectivity (Cardeña et al., 2013). These
studies illustrate how manipulating the experiential state of the
subject while collecting subjective reports can enrich and even
guide the investigation of brain networks and their psychological
correlates.
SUGGESTINGMETA-AWARENESS
Studying subjective experience entails tuning the mind to witness
itself. The concept of meta-awareness—i.e., explicit awareness
of the contents of one’s own ongoing experience—is therefore
central to neurophenomenology. The major thinkers associated
with the 20th century philosophical movement of Continental
Phenomenology struggled continually with the challenge of how
to observe and describe experiences whilst living through them
subjectively. Synthesizing these early philosophical efforts with
meditation techniques derived from contemplative wisdom tra-
ditions (i.e., Buddhism and Yoga), recent accounts have begun to
develop cognitive models of phenomenological inquiry and prac-
tical techniques for developing meta-awareness (Depraz et al.,
2000, 2003; Steinbock, 2004). These practices typically involve
subduing involuntary conceptualization and verbal overshadow-
ing processes that would otherwise interfere with amore reflexive,
embodied awareness of the experiential field. For the scientist
advancing a neurophenomenological approach, a crucial chal-
lenge is to enable the research participant to foster this kind of
open receptive awareness. We propose that hypnosis may provide
a valuable tool for helping subjects suspend narrative judgments,
loosen deep-seated patterns of conceptual elaboration, and sus-
tain clear and perceptive meta-awareness in an experimental
setting.
Meta-awareness seems to require a profound shift in our
common modes of attention—calling us to withhold discursive
conceptual elaboration and allow experiences to reveal them-
selves as they are. Cultivating this open receptivity to expe-
rience presents a formidable challenge, however, because our
patterns of discursive overlay and absorption in mental contents
are overlearned and highly automatic. Genuine meta-awareness,
therefore, may require powerful first-person tools for overrid-
ing habitual preoccupation with particular contents of expe-
rience and holding attention open to the ongoing process of
experience or the relationship between particular experiences.
In this regard, hypnosis may prove useful because it allows
highly suggestible individuals to derail processes typically con-
sidered ballistic and impervious to willful intervention (Lifshitz
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et al., 2013). For example, following a hypnotic suggestion to
see in black and white, highly responsive individuals perceived
brightly colored images in grayscale, with concomitant damp-
ening of low-level brain regions associated with color process-
ing (Kosslyn et al., 2000). Another example involves the classic
Stroop paradigm, wherein participants typically demonstrate a
lag when asked to report the ink color of incongruent color
words (e.g., the word “blue” printed in red) (Stroop, 1935).
Based on the robustness of this Stroop interference effect, most
cognitive scientists consider processing printed linguistic stimuli
inevitable for skilled readers (Macleod, 1991); however, a string
of reports from multiple independent laboratories demonstrate
that a suggestion to view the stimulus words as meaningless sym-
bols of a foreign language allows participants to override the
automaticity of reading and substantially reduce, or in some
cases even eliminate, the Stroop interference effect (Raz et al.,
2002, 2003, 2006, 2007; Raz and Campbell, 2011; Augustinova
and Ferrand, 2012; Parris et al., 2012). Neuroimaging assays
have begun to unravel the mechanisms of de-automatization
as a function of suggestion (Raz et al., 2005; Casiglia et al.,
2010; Terhune et al., 2010), while behavioral accounts have
extended these effects to related cognitive paradigms probing
automatic visual attention (Iani et al., 2006, 2009) as well
as ballistic multimodal perceptual integration (Lifshitz et al.,
2013). Appropriate suggestions, therefore, may allow highly sug-
gestible individuals to override automatic conceptual processes
that would otherwise interfere with clear phenomenological
awareness.
Although hypnosis typically involves suggestions emphasizing
specific, and often unusual, behaviors or perceptual experiences
(e.g., hallucinations), the defining feature of hypnosis is the flex-
ibility it affords for modulating aspects of consciousness, rather
than one particular state of attention that it induces. Indeed,
numerous cognitive and neuroimaging reports have documented
the power suggestion wields over attention functions and asso-
ciated brain networks (Egner et al., 2005; Raz et al., 2005; Iani
et al., 2006, 2009; Priftis et al., 2011; Raz and Campbell, 2011;
Terhune et al., 2011). Such potent subjective alterations could
potentially be adapted to derail habitual patterns of conceptual
judgment and support non-judgmental meta-awareness of the
present moment. Investigators have already begun experimenting
with using suggestion-based approaches to foster states of mind-
ful meta-awareness for therapeutic purposes (Lynn et al., 2006,
2010). Yet, efforts to improve meta-awareness via targeted sugges-
tion are still nascent, and the precise wording of such suggestions
would require fine-tuning based on the specific goals of the inves-
tigator. Classical descriptions of phenomenological awareness as
well as traditional meditation instructions would constitute a rich
point of departure. Suggestions may be as simple as, for exam-
ple, noting without judgment the arising and passing of thoughts,
emotions, and sensations on a moment-to-moment basis (Lynn
et al., 2012).
A subjective sense of effortlessness commonly accompanies
hypnotic response, rendering suggestion particularly well suited
to promoting meta-awareness. Phenomenologists have often
remarked that while one can consciously cultivate a ground
ripe for phenomenological insight, the moment of awareness
itself entails releasing effortful strategies that would otherwise
obscure the phenomena under investigation (Depraz et al.,
2000). Acting in accordance with hypnotic suggestions, sub-
jects generally report experiencing their thoughts and actions
as effortless and involuntary, as though “the cognitive mod-
ule that executes the suggestion does so outside of phenomenal
awareness” (Kihlstrom, 2008). Dissociative theories of hypno-
sis characterize hypnosis as a disruption between the cognitive
mechanisms responsible for executive control and executive mon-
itoring, respectively (Woody and Sadler, 2012). Thus, working
below the level of conscious effort, a suggestion for improved phe-
nomenological awareness may allow practitioners to notice their
experience while minimizing interference from the willful act of
observation.
One might object that because hypnotic procedures gener-
ally involve deep relaxation and mental absorption (Rainville
and Price, 2003), phenomenological reports following sugges-
tion would conflate the abnormal processes inherent in hypnotic
states with the processes involved in usual waking conscious-
ness. Atypical conscious states, however, need not accompany
response to suggestion; although common, relaxation, and fixed
attention are unnecessary for propelling responses associated with
hypnotic suggestion (Oakley and Halligan, 2010). Indeed, hyp-
notic phenomena frequently follow even in the absence of an
induction ritual or explicit mention of the context of hypno-
sis (Raz et al., 2006; Mazzoni et al., 2009; McGeown et al.,
2012) and responses to suggestions during hypnosis correlate
strongly with responses to the same suggestions outside of hyp-
nosis (Kirsch and Braffman, 2001). In addition, potential con-
founding factors associated with the hypnotic ritual can be
avoided by means of posthypnotic suggestion—a condition fol-
lowing termination of the hypnotic experience wherein a sub-
ject remains compliant to a suggestion made during hypnosis
(Raz and Buhle, 2006). Because posthypnotic suggestion func-
tions during common wakefulness, it may allow participants
to view their experience untarnished by abnormalities associ-
ated with the hypnotic procedure. Hypnotic and posthypnotic
suggestion, therefore, constitute potentially fruitful methods of
accomplishing receptive observation of fundamental experiential
processes.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERVIEW AS HYPNOTIC
ENCOUNTER
Hypnotic elements already tacitly suffuse established neurophe-
nomenological protocols. As we have seen, hypnosis provides a
tool for generating specific states of consciousness and poten-
tially improving first-person awareness of those states. The task
of neurophenomenology, however, remains incomplete until the
subject conveys a descriptive report from within that place of
awareness. Thus, in order to study individuals who lack exten-
sive phenomenological training, researchers require a method
of helping subjects uncover and discern aspects of their expe-
rience that would otherwise remain invisible. Toward this end,
phenomenologists have developed a technique called the “explic-
itation interview,” which incorporates inter-subjective guidance
and non-leading suggestions to promote awareness of processes
that typically remain implicit and un-seen within the field of
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 469 | 3
Lifshitz et al. Hypnosis as neurophenomenology
experience (Vermersch, 1990, 2009; Petitmengin, 2006). While
these methods are firmly grounded in phenomenological theory
and research, cognitive scientists seem hesitant to seize upon them
as experimental tools. Bridging such phenomenological methods
with scientific models of cognitive and neural function would
likely help establish the neurophenomenological approach in
mainstream cognitive science. Hypnosismay deliver a piece of this
missing link.While phenomenologists do not usually characterize
the explicitation interview as a form of hypnosis, the two practices
seem to share essential features: like hypnosis, the phenomeno-
logical interview reflects a social encounter involving attentional
transformations brought on by specific suggestions and carefully
cultivated expectations. Thus, we propose that the explicitation
interview offers a thought-provoking exemplar of hypnosis-as-
neurophenomenology.
The explicitation interview represents a form of “guided ret-
rospective introspection” (Maurel, 2009, p. 59). Interviewees
take on the “evocation position”—rediscovering bodily feel-
ings associated with the experience they wish to recall and
describe (Vermersch, 2009). Qualitative accounts intimate that
this embodied explicitation procedure allows untrained individ-
uals to gain awareness of previously obscured aspects of their
experience (Maurel, 2009). Such meta-awareness appears to fol-
low from a series of hypnosis-like interpersonal suggestions.
During phenomenological interviews, participants exhibit spe-
cific behavioral cues (e.g., spontaneous use of open pronouns
as opposed to personal pronouns: see Hendricks, 2009) that
may indicate an altered state of awareness similar to what some
researchers consider hypnotic absorption (Petitmengin, 2006;
Hendricks, 2009; Oakley and Halligan, 2009). Comparable to
hypnosis, moreover, the phenomenological interview involves a
dynamic exchange between an authoritative guide and a willing
participant who share explicit goals and expectations concern-
ing the desired results. Numerous studies drawing on hypno-
sis illuminate how social factors and expectation interact to
shape the outcomes of suggestion (Gandhi and Oakley, 2005;
Lifshitz et al., 2012). For example, simply labeling a proce-
dure as “hypnosis” strengthens the effects of certain sugges-
tions (Gandhi and Oakley, 2005). Analogous situational cues
and attitudes likely mold participant reports during phenomeno-
logical interviews. Phenomenologists not only appreciate such
socio-cognitive factors but even openly acknowledge suggestion-
based research, especially the work of renowned hypnosis pio-
neer Milton Erickson, as an important influence in devel-
oping the explicitation technique (Vermersch, 1990). Further
engaging with the extensive and ever-growing hypnosis litera-
ture may help neurophenomenologists capitalize on the implicit
expectations and suggestive elements inherent in the interview
context.
The relationship between memory and awareness is central
to phenomenological interviewing. Phenomenologists, however,
scarcely address the extensive data illustrating how hypnosis and
other forms of suggestion can either improve or bias recall of past
experiences. Two important events in the late twentieth century
marred popular conceptions of hypnosis in relation to memory:
the massive rise in dissociative identity disorder diagnoses
(Lynn et al., 2008) and the increasing interest in legal issues
surrounding the use of hypnotically enhanced memories in court
(Orne, 1979; Timm, 1981; Belli and Loftus, 1996). While these
historical misapplications have tainted the image of hypnosis as
a useful tool for evoking lost memories, the collective evidence
shows that judicious use of hypnotic techniques can actually
improve recall and decrease memory inaccuracy. Expectancies
and demand characteristics appear to play a primary role in
determining whether hypnosis or other suggestion-based proce-
dures will either improve or bias memory (Lynn et al., 2012). A
series of recent experiments demonstrates that instructing partic-
ipants to expect that hypnosis leads to accurate memory reporting
increases resilience to misleading information and decreases the
likelihood of false recall (Wagstaff et al., 2011). Participants may
respond to such expectancies by more closely monitoring the
process of recall and raising their threshold regarding which
memories feel true enough to report (Koriat and Goldsmith,
1996). By emphasizing non-leading questions and open prompts,
explicitation interviewers already appear conscientious of the
relationships among suggestion, expectation, and memory; con-
ducting experiments adapted from false memory studies (e.g.,
Belli and Loftus, 1996), moreover, may help to empirically con-
firm the validity of elicited reports. Deliberately crafting sug-
gestions that associate the explicitation procedure with correct
recall may serve to safeguard against the menace of confabulation
and help foster more detailed and accurate experiential
reports.
CONCLUSION
An overlooked boon to consciousness researchers, hypnosis is
unmatched in its capacity to rapidly evoke profound alterations
in experience. Hypnotic suggestion provides an efficient and
precise tool for meeting three core challenges of neurophe-
nomenology: (1) reliably generating altered states of awareness,
(2) fostering meta-awareness, and (3) encouraging accurate and
detailed experiential reports. Moreover, hypnosis-like dynamics
appear to implicitly permeate current phenomenological prac-
tices. As such, first and second-person approaches stand to
benefit from openly engaging with the science of suggestion;
on the flip side, such subjective methodologies would likely
advance the science of hypnosis. Whereas hypnosis research
is presently booming with experimental protocols for studying
the influence of suggestion on brain and behavior, researchers
seldom capitalize on phenomenological methods including the
explicitation interview. Such phenomenological methods may
serve to elucidate topical issues in hypnosis science. For exam-
ple, recent efforts have begun to harness first-person reports
alongside neuroimaging data to unravel spontaneous cognitive
and experiential fluctuations associated with hypnotic induc-
tion (Cardeña et al., 2013). These efforts reflect the spirit
of mutuality that the neurophenomenological community so
faithfully upholds. In line with this reciprocal attitude, braid-
ing together hypnosis science and subjective methodologies
promises to enrich our empirical understanding of both while
tilling the soil for future explorations of consciousness and
cognition.
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